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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's ruling denying IHC's motion to 
disqualify the Howard firm is based solely on the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and full faith and credit; the court did not 
reach the merits of the motion under the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility. (See Addendum to Appellant's Brief 
at 4, hereinafter "Add.") Respondents' Brief contains no 
response to IHC's argument in Point III of Appellant's Brief 
that the district court's order is insupportable under the 
doctrine of full faith and credit; therefore, that point is 
conceded and will not be discussed further. The district 
court's collateral estoppel ruling must be reversed for lack of 
identity of issues and the absence of a final judgment. 
Finally, if this Court addresses IHC's motion on the merits, 
disqualification is required under Utah law. 
Point I: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE APPLIED BECAUSE UTAH 
DISQUALIFICATION LAW IS DISTINCT FROM FEDERAL LAW 
AND THE FEDERAL COURT ORDER LACKED THE NECESSARY 
FINALITY. 
A. Lack of Identity of Issues 
Utah law is clear that for collateral estoppel to apply, 
the issues in the two actions must be "identical." Wilde v. 
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981). 
Respondents attempt to soften that standard by arguing that 
collateral estoppel may apply if the issues are "substantially 
the same." Respondents concede that the disqualification motion 
in Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 
(D. Utah 1986), "was decided under federal law," but argue that 
the issue raised here is the same because Utah law and federal 
law on disqualification are "substantially identical." (Resp. 
Br. 7-9.) The simplicity of the argument carries a certain 
appeal, but its premise is false. Careful comparison of Utah 
law as stated in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 
1985), to federal law as stated in Bodily demonstrates that 
the two are distinct. 
Respondents argue that Margulies relied heavily on 
federal case law and note that Margulies cites two federal 
cases for the point that Canon 5 cannot be avoided by simply 
dropping one of the two conflicting representations. (Resp. Br. 
9.) That analysis of Margulies is superficial and 
misleading. This Court in Margulies relied on federal law 
only in formulating the appropriate standard of review and in 
focusing its analysis on Canon 5 rather than Canon 4. 696 P.2d 
at 1199-1200, 1202-03. The two federal cases referred to by 
respondents were cited in Margulies only to support the 
Court's focus on the simultaneous representation principles of 
Canon 5 despite counsel's prior voluntary withdrawal from one of 
the two actions. Neither federal case supports the ultimate 
holding in Margulies, as respondents later recognize (Resp. 
Br. 17), because in both the disqualification motion was denied. 
The Margulies holding, that the challenged law firm was 
required to withdraw from both actions, was not based on 
federal law, but on an original, independent analysis drawn from 
the language of Canons 5 and 9, prior Utah cases, and this 
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Court's view of the importance of undivided loyalty and the 
integrity of the judicial system. 696 P.2d at 1203-05. This 
Court's conclusion that a violation of Canon 5 "may not be cured 
or rectified by an optional withdrawal in the case of 
[counsel's] choice" cites no federal precedent. M . at 1204. 
Likewise, the conclusion that "a serious appearance of 
impropriety" coupled with a violation of Canon 5 "requires" 
withdrawal from both actions is based on no federal precedent. 
Id. at 1205. Thus, Utah law as declared in Margulies is 
neither based on, nor the same as, federal law. 
As for federal disqualification law, respondents concede 
that the Bodily court "cites predominantly federal cases in 
Section III of his opinion" dealing with the appropriate 
sanction, but argue that those cases "are not contrary to Utah 
law." (Resp. Br. 10.) That is not accurate. The federal cases 
chiefly relied upon by the Bodily court stand for a 
"restrained approach" that requires disqualification only where 
the ethical violations are demonstrated to have prejudiced the 
opposing party or to have tainted the underlying litigation. 
(Add. 26-27 and n.20.) No such demonstration is required under 
this Court's statement of Utah disqualification law in 
Margulies. Moreover, the citation of Margulies in footnote 
21 of the Bodily opinion is not offered in support of the 
Bodily holding, but only to illustrate a possible mitigating 
factor if Johnson did in fact disclose the conflict to 
Rosenbloom. 
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Thus, federal disqualification law is distinct from Utah 
law regarding the appropriate sanction for violations of Canons 
5 and 9. The state district court could find that under Utah 
law disqualification is required even though the federal 
district court concluded that under federal law it was not 
required. Accordingly, the issue of the appropriate sanction 
for violation of Canons 5 and 9 in this case is not "identical" 
to the issue decided in Bodily, and collateral estoppel cannot 
apply. 
B. Absence of Final Judgment on the Merits 
Respondents concede that a ruling must be final for 
purposes of res judicata, but argue that finality is not 
necessary for application of collateral estoppel. (Resp. Br. 
11-12.) Utah law does not support such an artificial 
distinction, and respondents cite none. In fact, Utah law is 
clear that the same degree of finality is required for 
collateral estoppel as for res judicata. See Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983); Baxter 
v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 
1985); see also Gresham Park Community Organization v. 
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. 1981) (finality 
requirement not relaxed for collateral estoppel). 
The purpose of the finality requirement is the same for 
collateral estoppel as for res judicata, which is to prevent 
conclusive reliance on a tentative ruling that is subject to 
change. See IB Moore's Federal Practice HIT 0.409[1] and 
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0.441[4]; U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). As respondents admit (Resp. Br. 
12), the disqualification ruling in Bodily "remains 
technically subject to revision" if further discovery reveals 
that the conflicting representation actually prejudiced IHC or 
would taint future proceedings. Accordingly, the ruling on the 
motion in this case should not be allowed to rest on the 
potentially shifting order in Bodily. 
In sum, the Bodily ruling may not be accorded 
collateral estoppel effect in this case. Respondents have made 
no attempt to refute or distinguish the Utah cases cited at 
Appellant's Brief pp. 9-10 specifically holding that litigation 
of a matter in federal court under federal law does not bar 
subsequent adjudication of the matter in a different case in 
state court under state law. Therefore, the district court's 
ruling must be reversed. 
Point II; IF THIS COURT REACHES THE MERITS OF THE UNDERLYING 
MOTION, DISQUALIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IS 
REQUIRED UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Respondents argue that if this Court reverses the 
collateral estoppel ruling, it should proceed to address the 
disqualification motion on the merits. (Resp. Br. 13.) While 
IHC questions the authority for such a course, it has no 
objection to a ruling on the merits of the motion should the 
Court deem it appropriate. 
Respondents argue that the Howard firm's violations of 
Canons 5 and 9 do not require disqualification because Johnson's 
involvement in Wilson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
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Civil No. 69908 (Fourth Dist., filed June 14, 1985), was 
limited, and the Howard firm did not acquire or have access to 
confidential information concerning IHC. (Resp. Br. 14-16.) 
However, those arguments assume facts contrary to the evidence 
and miss the essence of Canons 5 and 9 as construed in 
Margulies. 
A. Canon 5 
Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent 
professional judgment on behalf of a client; it does not pertain 
to preservation of client confidences. To comply with Canon 5, 
a lawyer is required to 
. . . decline proffered employment if the exercise of his 
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the 
acceptance of the proffered employment, except to the 
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). [DR 5-105(A).] 
Conflicting representation is presumed to have an "adverse 
effect" on a lawyer's professional judgment in behalf of a 
client. See In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978); 
Margulies, supra, at 1203 n.4. DR 5-105(C) permits 
concurrent representation of two adverse clients only if (1) it 
is obvious that the lawyer is able to represent both clients 
adequately; and (2) the lawyer obtains consent from both 
clients "after full disclosure of the possible effect of such 
representations on the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each." The burden is on the attorney 
undertaking the adverse employment to prove compliance with both 
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requirements. Margulies, supra, at 1203; In re Hansen, 
supra, at 415. 
1. Obviousness 
In this case it was not "obvious" that the Howard firm 
could adequately represent the interests of both clients. 
Johnson testified that he had a thorough understanding of the 
prohibition against conflicts of interest. (I Tr. 50-51; see 
also I Tr. 69-70.) In fact, Johnson had personal experience 
disqualifying opposing counsel for ethical violations. See 
Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985); see also 
II Tr. 42-45. Johnson testified that he immediately recognized 
an obvious conflict of interest in undertaking to represent IHC 
in Wilson while suing IHC in this case and other malpractice 
actions. (I Tr. 49-52.) The Bodily court concluded that it 
was obvious the Howard firm could not adequately represent the 
conflicting interests: 
The point is that the conflict should have been obvious 
to anyone in the Howard firm, and in fact the conflict 
was obvious to Mr. Johnson . . . . [Add. 20.] 
That conclusion is also justified in this case. 
2. Informed Client Consent 
Concurrent conflicting representation may be undertaken 
only after full disclosure to, and consent of, both clients. DR 
5-105(C); Margulies, supra, at 1203-04. In this case there 
is no dispute that Johnson at no time personally contacted the 
plaintiffs in this case or IHC about a possible conflict. It is 
also undisputed that Johnson received no consent from either of 
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the clients. (See I Tr. 77-80 and citations in Appellant's Br. 
pp. 2-3, Bodily, Add. 21-22.) Johnson testified that he 
disclosed the conflict to Rosenbloom, IHC's California counsel. 
However, even if true, that did not relieve the Howard firm of 
the duty to obtain the requisite consent of both clients after 
full disclosure, as mandated by Canon 5. Margulies, supra, 
at 1198-99, 1203-04. A lawyer may not discharge his duty under 
Canon 5 by disclosing the conflict to the client's other 
counsel and then claim "constructive disclosure" to the 
client. I.B.M. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 281-82 (3rd Cir. 
1978). Absent disclosure of the conflicting representation to 
the clients, there could obviously be no informed consent by the 
clients. 
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the Howard firm 
violated Canon 5. (R. 307; Bodily, Add. 23; Margulies, 
supra, at 1203-04. Whether the Howard firm in fact acquired 
confidential information during the Wilson representation is 
immaterial to Canon 5. Even if it were relevant, the Howard 
firm's access to such information (See Appellant's Br. p.3; 
Bodily, Add.11) is regarded as equally repugnant under the 
standards of professional conduct. Margulies viewed no 
material distinction between actual acquisition and mere access 
to confidential information. 696 P.2d at 1202. Under Canon 5 
analysis, the result is the same because the focus is on the 
exercise of independent professional judgment, not on disclosure 
of client confidences. Here, the conflicting representations 
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clearly divided the Howard firm's loyalty and diminished its 
independent professional judgment on behalf of IHC. 
B. Canon 9 
Canon 9 requires a lawyer to avoid even the appearance of 
professional impropriety. As defined in Margulies: 
The basis of this tenet is that society's perception of 
the integrity of our legal system may be as important as 
the reality, since it is the perception that engenders 
public confidence that justice will be dispensed. 
Litigants are highly unlikely to be able to maintain 
this confidence if their attorney in one matter is 
allowed simultaneously to sue them in another. [696 
P.2d at 1204, emphasis added.] 
Canon 9 requires a lawyer to be "unreservedly identified with 
his client's interests." In re Hansen, supra, 586 P.2d at 
416. The Howard firm's concurrent conflicting representation 
certainly creates an appearance of professional impropriety, as 
respondents concede. (Resp. Br. 16 n.4.) See Margulies, 
supra, at 1204-05; see also Gillette v. Newhouse Realty 
Co., 75 Utah 13, 282 P. 776, 779-80 (1929) (discussion of 
public policy in prohibiting conflicts of interest and 
appearances of impropriety); In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 
833-36, 849 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (discussing Canons under Utah 
law) . 
In view of the Howard firm's violations of Canons 5 and 
9, it is evident under Margulies that disqualification is 
required. See Margulies, supra, at 1204-05, and 
discussion in Appellant's Br. pp. 5-6. 
-9-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the district court1s ruling 
should be reversed and the case should be remanded for a ruling 
on the merits of the disqualification motion, or this Court 
should order disqualification prior to remand. 
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